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FCC v. Fox Television Stations and the Role of Logical
Error in Hard Look Review
I. INTRODUCTION
Logical reasoning plays an important but delicate role in the
American legal system. We expect the branches of government
responsible for applying the law—the judicial and executive
branches—to do so faithfully. Their actions have concrete
consequences for real people, and, therefore, we expect such actions
to be supported with valid, logical reasoning. Of course, we also
hope the legislative branch selects its policies after exploring the
options and that it uses logic to choose those that make the most
sense, but the inherent uncertainties surrounding policy decisions
and the legislature’s political accountability for bad choices perhaps
demand less logical rigor in the policymaking process.
Administrative agencies, however, occupy a unique position in
the American legal system. Agencies are not directly accountable to
the people as are Congress and the President,1 yet their power
embraces executive, legislative, and even judicial authority. The
political checks that ensure Congress does not stray too far from
reason, therefore, are perhaps less effective against agencies as
policymakers. Independent agencies are even more insulated from
political pressure—their officials may enjoy tenure of office and are
therefore free from an important source of control from the
President.2 Considering the broad power exercised by administrative
agencies and the reduced political accountability, surely we must
expect this “fourth branch”3 of government to exercise good
reasoning in administering the laws.

1. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984).
2. While there have been those who challenge the constitutionality of independent
agencies ever since the Supreme Court upheld them in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,
see, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 582 (1994), the Court has yet to seriously entertain the possibility that
Humphrey’s Executor should be overruled.
3. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports, 535 U.S. 743, 773 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
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In fact, Congress has taken steps to ensure that administrative
agencies adhere to logical reasoning, at least to some extent. The
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) prescribes certain procedures
that agencies must follow in rulemaking and adjudications4 and
makes agency decisions reviewable by the courts.5 While formal
rulemaking and adjudicatory decisions must be borne out completely
by the evidence developed in an administrative record,6 more
informal decisions are upheld as long as they are not “arbitrary,
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.”7 Thus, even if an agency is
not always required to justify its decision with hard evidence, it must
offer some non-arbitrary justification for its decisions.
But how rigorous must the agency’s logic process be to convince
a court that its decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion? Certainly, the agency must offer some explanation for its
action that does not defy logic,8 but even courts—the bastions of
logic in the American legal system—often indulge in informal
fallacies without batting an eye.9 Thus, it would not be surprising to
discover that the courts are willing to tolerate some degree of error
in the logical processes of administrative decision-making.
This Note explores one of the Supreme Court’s most recent
cases reviewing an agency’s exercise of policymaking discretion and
the role of logic in that process. In FCC v. Fox Television Stations,10
the Court heard a challenge to the Federal Communication
Commission’s (“FCC”) decision to change its policy regarding the
prohibition of broadcast indecency and profanity. Following a
number of complaints for broadcasts of the “F-Word” during live
broadcasts, the FCC abandoned its earlier policy that held that
broadcasts of fleeting expletives did not amount to indecent
speech.11

4. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344,
4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2009).
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2006).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
8. See David H. Becker, Changing Direction in Administrative Agency Rulemaking:
“Reasoned Analysis,” The Roadless Rule Repeal, and the 2006 National Park Service
Management Policies, 30 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 65, 69–70 (2006).
9. See generally BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF LOGIC (forthcoming).
10. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
11. Id. at 1807–08.
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While all of the Justices purported to agree that a heightened
standard of review is not necessary, the Court sharply divided on
what the “arbitrary or capricious” standard required in this case.12
The majority upheld the FCC’s decision, ignoring and, at times,
endorsing logically fallacious arguments put forward by the FCC.
This treatment of the FCC’s explanation for its decision signals a
willingness on the part of the Court to overlook informal errors in
agency reasoning, at least when the agency decision does not ignore
factual findings. This relaxation of “hard look” review may, in turn,
allow agencies that desire to change policy for purely political reasons
to do so as long as they can provide some justification that does not
completely defy logic.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II reviews the FCC’s history
in regulating broadcast indecency and profanity and introduces Fox
Television Stations. Part III explains the principles of hard look
review that guide review of informal agency policymaking decisions.
Part IV discusses the logical errors employed by the FCC in
defending its decision to change its broadcast indecency policy and
suggests that the logically flawed justification it provided may have
masked primarily political motivations. Part V offers a brief
conclusion.
II. FCC REGULATION OF BROADCAST INDECENCY AND PROFANITY
The FCC is an independent federal agency “charged with
regulating interstate and international communications by radio,
television, wire, satellite and cable.”13 The FCC’s five Commissioners
are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to serve
five-year terms, and no more than three Commissioners may be
members of the same political party.14 While the President designates
the FCC chairman,15 he has no authority to remove Commissioners
without cause and, therefore, has no formal power to direct the FCC
in its regulatory activities.
The FCC’s organic statute, the Communications Act of 1934,
established the FCC and created a system whereby private entities

12. See id. at 1810–11 n.2.
13. Federal Communications Commission, About the FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/
aboutus.html.
14. Id.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).
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may obtain limited-term broadcast licenses.16 The licensing system
ensures that the United States “maintain[s] . . . control . . . over all
the channels of radio transmissions,” while granting persons the use
of those channels.17 The government’s ability to control the content
of broadcasts is limited, however, by statute and the First
Amendment. The Communications Act proclaims:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give
the Commission the power of censorship over the radio
communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
means of radio communication.18

However, while the FCC may not engage in censorship, Congress
has also forbidden by criminal statute the “utter[ance] [of] any
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication”19 and has instructed the FCC to enforce this
prohibition for broadcasts made on public television between the
hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.20
A. Pacifica and Its Aftermath
While the indecency ban has been on the books since 1934, the
FCC did not invoke it until 1975, when it found a daytime
broadcast of George Carlin’s monologue, “Filthy Words,” to be

16. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2000, Supp. V).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); see also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (“A
licensed broadcaster is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the
public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public
obligations.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Office of Commc’n of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (1966))).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2006).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).
20. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, P.L. 102-356 § 16(a), 106 Stat. 954
(1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303, note) (“The Federal Communications Commission shall
promulgate regulations to prohibit the broadcasting of indecent programming—(1) between 6
a.m. and 10 p.m. on any day by any public radio station or public television station that goes
off the air at or before 12 midnight; and (2) between 6 a.m. and 12 midnight on any day for
any radio or television broadcasting station not described in paragraph (1).”). The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held the prohibition on indecent speech between
the hours of 10 p.m. and midnight unconstitutional. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC,
58 F.3d 654, 669–70 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996).
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actionably indecent.21 In defining the term “indecent,” the FCC
concluded that the concept is “intimately connected with the
exposure of children to language that describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times
of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience.”22
Significantly, this definition of “indecent” differs from the
definition of “obscene,” and therefore includes language that is
indisputably subject to some degree of First Amendment
protection.23 The FCC reasoned that indecent language, when
broadcast at a time when children are likely to be in the audience,
was similar to a public nuisance, and should, therefore, generally be
regulated using nuisance principles.24 Thus, while the definition of
“indecent” should not depend on the audience, a different standard
would perhaps be appropriate “[w]hen the number of children in the
audience is reduced to a minimum.”25
The radio station that had broadcast the monologue challenged
the FCC’s order, but failed to convince the Supreme Court either
that section 1464 only prohibited obscene language, or that the
statute as applied violated the First Amendment.26 In FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, the Court upheld the FCC’s definition of “indecent,”
and concluded that the statute, as applied in that case, did not
impermissibly infringe the radio station’s freedom of speech.27 In his
majority opinion, Justice Stevens concluded by emphasizing the
narrowness of the Court’s opinion: “We have not decided that an
occasional expletive in [a two-way radio conversation or a telecast of

21. Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94,
1975 WL 29897 (1975).
22. Id. ¶ 11.
23. The FCC explicitly disavowed its prior decisions that had defined “indecent” in
terms of an earlier formulation of obscenity. Id. ¶ 10 (“The Commission did offer a definition
in WUHY-FM, but relied substantially on the then existing definition of obscenity. In view of
subsequent decisions (Miller and Illinois Citizens), we are reformulating the concept of
‘indecent.’” (citations omitted)).
24. Id. ¶ 11.
25. Id. ¶ 12.
26. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
27. Id. at 747–51.
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an Elizabethan comedy] . . . would justify any sanction or, indeed,
that this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution.”28
Justice Powell further emphasized the narrowness of the Court’s
opinion in his concurrence. He, joined by Justice Blackmun, both of
whom were necessary to form a majority, made it clear that “[t]he
Commission’s holding, and certainly the Court’s holding today, does
not speak to cases involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive
word in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from the
verbal shock treatment administered by respondent here.”29
The FCC responded to the Court’s signals in Pacifica by
developing a fairly narrow enforcement policy over the next several
years.30 In particular, the FCC distinguished between literal uses of
offensive words that have to do with sex or excretion and expletive
uses of those words.31 The FCC stated, “If a complaint focuses solely
on the use of expletives, we believe that under the legal standards set
forth in Pacifica, deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive
manner is a requisite to a finding of indecency.”32 Whereas fleeting
uses of offensive words in a nonliteral sense would not constitute
indecency, actual “description or depiction of sexual or excretory
functions” would be “examined in context to determine whether it is
patently offensive under contemporary community standards
applicable to the broadcast medium.”33
Thus, after Pacifica, the FCC took a very cautious approach to
regulating broadcast speech. Indeed, while the statute prohibits both
indecent and profane speech, the FCC eschewed any interpretation
of profanity that would encompass speech that was not also indecent
or obscene, holding that “[p]rofanity that does not fall under one of
the above two categories is fully protected by the First Amendment

28. Id. at 750.
29. Id. at 760–61 (Powell, J., concurring).
30. See Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254, ¶ 10, 1978 WL
36042 (1978) (expressing its “inten[tion] strictly to observe the narrowness of the Pacifica
holding”); Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699, ¶ 12, 1987 WL 345577 (1987)
(holding that enforcement power not limited to “deliberate, repetitive use of the seven words
actually contained in the George Carlin monologue”); Id. ¶ 13 (preserving distinction
between literal and nonliteral uses of evocative language and suggesting that “deliberate and
repetitive use . . . is a requisite to a finding of indecency” when complaint focuses solely on
expletive use).
31. Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 ¶ 13 (1987).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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and cannot be regulated.”34 In sum, after Pacifica, the test for
indecency prescribed a two-prong analysis. The FCC and reviewing
courts must ask two questions: (1) whether the language, in context,
depicts or describes sexual or excretory activities or organs, and (2)
whether it does so in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium.35
B. The FCC Changes Course
On March 3, 2004, the FCC adopted an opinion and order (the
Golden Globes Order) holding that daytime broadcasts of single or
fleeting uses of the “F-Word,” “S-Word,” and other profanities “as
highly offensive as the ‘F-Word’” would no longer be tolerated.36
The case arose after the FCC received several complaints alleging
that the 2003 Golden Globes Awards program included a broadcast
of the singer Bono saying, “[T]his is really, really, fucking brilliant.
Really, really great.”37 The Enforcement Bureau, applying the
“fleeting expletives exception,” had found that the material “did not
describe, in context, sexual or excretory organs or activities and that
the utterance was fleeting and isolated.”38 On appeal, the FCC found
that the utterance constituted both actionable indecency and
profanity, and announced that the fleeting expletives exception is
“no longer good law.”39
In analyzing the question whether Bono’s statement constituted
indecency, the FCC applied the two-prong test developed from
Pacifica. First, it determined that, “given the core meaning of the
‘F-Word,’ any use of that word or a variation, in any context,
inherently has a sexual connotation, and therefore falls within the
first prong of our indecency definition.”40 The FCC asserted that its
conclusion was consistent with the original Pacifica decision, “in
which the Commission held that the ‘F-Word’ does depict or
34. FCC, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING (1999), available at 1999 WL 391297
(F.C.C.).
35. Industry Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464
and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8002 (2001).
36. Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4981 (2004) [hereinafter Golden Globes
Order].
37. Id. at 4976 n.4.
38. Id. at 4975–76.
39. Id. at 4980–81.
40. Id. at 4978 (emphasis added).
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describe sexual activities.”41 The FCC also found that the language
was “patently offensive under contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium.”42 The FCC argued that, as one of the
“most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in
the English language,” use of the “F-Word” “invariably invokes a
coarse sexual image.”43 In the Golden Globes case, its use was
“shocking and gratuitous” and lacked any “political, scientific or
other independent value . . . or any other factors to mitigate its
offensiveness.”44 The FCC feared that failing to take action against
isolated uses of such language “would likely lead to more widespread
use of the offensive language.”45
Finally, the FCC asserted that its decision was “not inconsistent
with the Supreme Court ruling in Pacifica” because the Court had
“left open the issue of whether an occasional expletive could be
considered indecent.”46 While the FCC justified its decision with
reference to Pacifica, it conceded that its holding constituted a
change in FCC policy, both in terms of indecency law and profanity
law.47 Because the broadcast would not have been actionable under
the FCC’s previous standards, it declined to impose sanctions against
the offending broadcast licensees.48
Following the Golden Globes Order, the FCC issued notices of
apparent liability for several broadcasts aired between 2002 and 2005
that it deemed actionably indecent, but again refrained from
imposing sanctions.49 After a remand from the Second Circuit to

41. Id. For an analysis of this argument as a vicious abstraction, see infra Part IV.A.1.
42. Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4979 (2004).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 4982.
47. Id. at 4980 (“In Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 FCC Rcd 2698, 2699 (1987) . . . the
Commission stated as follows: ‘If a complaint focuses solely on the use of expletives, we believe
that . . . deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive manner is a requisite to a finding of
indecency.’ . . . We now depart from this portion of the Commission’s 1987 Pacifica decision
as well as . . . any similar cases holding that isolated or fleeting use of the ‘F-Word’ or a variant
thereof in situations such as this is not indecent and conclude that such cases are not good law
to that extent.”). The FCC’s new rule regarding profanity itself has serious First Amendment
implications as well as implications for hard look review. However, because in Fox Television
Stations neither the parties nor the Supreme Court focused on the FCC’s new profanity rule,
this Note also defers that discussion to another day.
48. Id. at 4981–82.
49. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1808–10 (2009).
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allow the licensees to contest the decisions, the FCC upheld most of
its findings of indecency.50 Two of these broadcasts involved
programs aired by Fox Television Stations—the 2002 Billboard
Music Awards and the 2003 Billboard Music Awards.51 Fox had
failed to “bleep out” offensive language uttered by Cher as she
accepted an award in the 2002 show, and by Nicole Richie as an
awards presenter in the 2003 broadcast.52 While the FCC in its
Remand Order contended that the broadcasts would have been
actionable prior to the Golden Globes Order,53 the Golden Globes
Order removed any doubt that the language was actionable.54
In justifying its findings under the Golden Globes Order, the FCC
rejected any “strict dichotomy between ‘expletives’ and ‘descriptions
or depictions of sexual or excretory functions’” because “an
‘expletive’s’ power to offend derives from its sexual or excretory
meaning.”55 Furthermore, the FCC referenced the difficulty in
certain cases of determining whether a word is being used in an
expletive or literal sense.56 Finally, the FCC believed that
“categorically requiring repeated use of expletives in order to find
material indecent is inconsistent with [its] general approach to
indecency enforcement, which stresses the critical nature of
context.”57 Such a requirement would “permit broadcasters to air
expletives at all hours of a day so long as they did so one at a time.”58

50. Id.; see Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and
Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006) [hereinafter Remand Order].
51. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1808–10.
52. Id.
53. Cher’s use of the “F-Word,” the FCC argued, involved a description or reference to
“a sexual act as a metaphor to express hostility to her critics. The fact that she was not literally
suggesting that people engage in sexual activities does not necessarily remove the use of the
term from the realm of descriptions or depictions.” Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299,
13324 (2006). Nicole Richie, for her part, had used the “F-Word” as an expletive, but had
also used the “S-Word” as a literal description of excrement. Id. at 13307–08. Furthermore,
the FCC believed her language could have been indecent under the previous standard because
it involved more than one offensive word and appeared to be deliberate. Id.
54. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1809 (citing Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R.
13299, 13308 ¶ 23, 13325 ¶ 61).
55. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13308 (2006).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 13309.
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III. HARD LOOK REVIEW
Needless to say, Fox was not happy with the FCC’s order. Even
though the FCC had not imposed sanctions for the offending
broadcasts, Fox, joined by other intervening broadcasters, appealed
to the Second Circuit. The Court of Appeals set aside the agency’s
orders after finding the FCC’s change of policy in the Golden Globes
Order to be arbitrary and capricious in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act.59 A sharply divided Supreme Court,
however, reversed the Second Circuit, and reinstated the FCC’s
orders.60 While the Justices agreed that no heightened scrutiny was
needed for agency changes in policy, they strongly disagreed on what
the “arbitrary and capricious” standard required in this context.61
In deciding FCC v. Fox Television Stations, all of the Justices
agreed that the decision required application of the principles of
“hard look” review.62 This method of reviewing informal agency
policymaking decisions by asking whether the agency took a “‘hard
look’ at the salient problems . . . and . . . genuinely engaged in
reasoned decision-making,” originated in the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit.63 But the current approach to arbitrary and
capricious review was laid down by the Supreme Court in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n. v. State Farm.64
In State Farm, the Court reviewed a decision by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) rescinding its
previously promulgated motor vehicle safety standards.65 In
accordance with its mandate under the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, which directed the agency to issue motor vehicle
safety standards, the NHTSA had developed a rule, also known as
Standard 208, requiring auto manufacturers to include passive
restraints in new vehicles.66 At various stages in the rulemaking
process, the regulation included requirements for airbags, automatic
seatbelts, ignition interlocks for manual seatbelts, and manually
59. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454 (2007), rev’d 129 S. Ct.
1800 (2009).
60. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
64. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 33–37.

696

DO NOT DELETE

687

4/16/2010 3:52 PM

FCC v. Fox Television Stations

detachable automatic seatbelts.67 At times, the process was politically
charged, with Congress stepping in to ban the unpopular ignition
interlock system and asserting a potential legislative veto on “any
safety standard that could be satisfied by a system other than
seatbelts.”68 The President also appeared to have stepped into the
controversy, as Justice O’Connor recognized that “the agency’s
changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a
new President of a different political party.”69
After a “complex and convoluted” rulemaking process, the
agency finally rescinded its adopted rule.70 The final rule had
mandated the phasing in of passive restraints, but left discretion with
automakers in determining whether to use airbags or automatic
seatbelts.71 In explaining the rescission, the agency argued “it was no
longer able to find . . . that the automatic restraint requirement
would produce significant safety benefits.”72 The Supreme Court,
however, found the agency’s reasoning insufficient and directed it to
“consider the matter further or adhere to or amend Standard 208
along lines which its analysis supports.”73
The Court struck down the agency’s rescission as arbitrary and
capricious because the stated reasons for the decision did not support
the result. After automakers largely opted to comply with the
regulation by installing automatic belts rather than airbags, the
agency determined that the “detachable automatic belts will not
attain anticipated safety benefits because so many individuals will
detach the mechanism.”74 The Court, however, did not see how this
conclusion, even if true, would justify a complete rescission of the
rule. According to the Court, this conclusion
standing alone . . . would not justify any more than an amendment
of Standard 208 to disallow compliance by means of the one
technology which will not provide effective passenger protection. It

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 59 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 34 (majority opinion).
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 47.

697

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/16/2010 3:52 PM

2010

does not cast doubt on the need for a passive restraint standard or
upon the efficacy of airbag technology.75

State Farm established two important principles. First, the Court
held that rescissions of agency action should be treated the same as
positive agency action, and because a
“settled course of behavior embodies the agency’s informed
judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will carry out the policies
committed to it by Congress[,]” . . . an agency changing its course
by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for
the change beyond that which may be required when an agency
does not act in the first instance.76

Second, the Court confirmed that when agencies exercise discretion
to make policy, they must provide a reasoned explanation connecting
their findings with the decisions they make.77 In determining
whether an agency has met this standard, courts must ask whether
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.78

Thus, while a change in policy does not require a stricter standard of
review than that applied to initial agency policy decisions, the agency
must give valid reasons for making the change.
State Farm’s test for arbitrary and capricious review suggests that
agency decisions should be guided only by agency expertise informed
by a rigorous investigation of available evidence. And while lower
courts have upheld agency decisions based on policy considerations
when factual findings are unavailable,79 agencies generally justify
75. Id.
76. Id. at 41–42 (quoting Atchison T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S.
800, 807–08 (1973)).
77. Id. at 34 (“Briefly summarized, we hold that the agency failed to present an
adequate basis and explanation for rescinding the passive restraint requirement and that the
agency must either consider the matter further or adhere to or amend Standard 208 along lines
which its analysis supports.”).
78. Id. at 43.
79. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 956 F.2d 309, 315–16
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding a decision by the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) to
require inspections of underwater bridge members every five years (the period recommended
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their policy decisions in technocratic, scientific terms.80 Political
influences might motivate an agency to decide to address a particular
problem, but State Farm indicates that they should not provide the
sole justification for a final decision.
However, in spite of State Farm’s direction that political
considerations may not, by themselves, formally justify agency policy
decisions, hard look review may not always effectively deter agencies
from basing their decisions on political factors in practice. First, in
some cases the agency may have insufficient data to make any
decision. In those instances, even outright recognition of political
motivation may be sufficient to justify the agency action.81 In other
cases, the evidence might support more than one outcome. As long
as the agency can justify its choice between alternatives with a
rational explanation based on the evidence, it may hide the fact that
political preferences tipped the scale one way or the other. In these
instances, hard look review may not effectively deter essentially
political decisions to the fullest extent.
The level of deterrence possible may depend, however, on how
rigorous courts are in analyzing the logic of agency decisions. For
example, if an agency selects one alternative for political reasons
when evidence or reason weigh more heavily in favor of another
alternative, we might expect to find fallacious arguments in the
agency’s explanation for its decision. If courts demand strictly logical
explanations, then agencies may have fewer opportunities to mask
their essentially political decisions. If, however, courts are willing to
tolerate a degree of fallacious argument in finding an agency
explanation rational, then agencies may often succeed in placing
significant weight on political considerations.
IV. INFORMAL FALLACIES IN FCC V. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS
FCC v. Fox Television Stations is significant because it signals a
willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to tolerate logical
errors in agency reasoning, at least when the basis for a decision
turns on the construction of judicial precedent rather than factual

by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials) even though FHA
did not have any factual findings to support its decision).
80. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 5, 5 n.4 (2009).
81. See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 956 F.2d at 315–16.
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findings. Every Supreme Court Justice agreed that the FCC’s
decision to abandon its fleeting expletives policy required a reasoned
explanation under State Farm, but the majority ignored or even
endorsed several logically fallacious arguments that the FCC
included in its Golden Globes Order and Remand Order. This
willingness to tolerate logical error is particularly significant in light
of the Court’s explicit recognition that the FCC had reached its
decision under political pressure from Congress. While it may be too
soon to say that agencies have been granted a broad license to base
their decisions on political preferences, the Supreme Court’s ruling
in this case almost certainly reinforced agencies’ perceptions that
their decisions need not be “model[s] for agency explanation”82 in
order to survive “a ‘searching and careful’ review by the courts.”83
A. Logical Errors in the FCC Orders
The FCC’s Golden Globes Order and Remand Order provide
several explanations for its decision to abandon the fleeting expletive
exception to the prohibition on broadcast indecency and profanity.
Three areas of the FCC’s decision, in particular, are problematic.
First, its explanation for abandoning the distinction between literal
and nonliteral uses of offensive words relies on appeals to authority,
vicious abstraction, and irrelevant arguments. Second, the FCC’s
decision to change its policy because the fleeting expletive exception
required viewers to suffer the “first blow” indulges in a fallacious
slippery slope argument and also focuses on the wrong question.
Finally, its decision that the new policy was constitutional entirely
avoids relevant arguments.
1. Abandoning the distinction between literal and nonliteral usage
In supporting its new policy, Justice Scalia found that the FCC
had reasoned that “it made no sense to distinguish between literal
and nonliteral uses of offensive words, requiring repetitive use to
render only the latter indecent.”84 However, while the Court found
this to be a rational reason for the FCC to “expand[] the scope of its

82. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1824 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
83. Id. (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971)).
84. Id. at 1812.
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enforcement activity,”85 there is room to doubt the soundness of the
FCC’s argument.
It is not clear why a distinction between literal and nonliteral
uses of offensive words makes no sense. In the Golden Globes Order,
the FCC had argued that the “F-Word” always describes or depicts
sexual activity,86 and in the Remand Order it explained that this is
because “the word’s power to insult and offend derives from its
sexual meaning.”87 But the FCC’s bald assertion that “given the core
meaning of the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word or a variation, in any
context”88 describes or depicts sexual activity does not make it so.
And at no point has the FCC offered an explanation for why every
use of the “F-Word” must “fall[] within the first prong of [its]
indecency definition” other than its belief that the “F-Word” bears
an inherently sexual connotation.89
In the Golden Globes Order, the FCC supported its conclusion by
appealing to the authority of its original opinion in Pacifica, which,
it noted, had been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.90 While
agency decisions may legitimately rely on agency precedent, and
indeed may be set aside for ignoring relevant precedent,91 the FCC’s
reliance on its 1975 Pacifica decision in this case is unfounded. In
Pacifica, the FCC explicitly noted that its conclusion was made by
applying a number of considerations to a monologue, which, in its
context, had used those offensive, sexually charged words in a way
that actually did describe sexual and excretory activity and organs.92
While the FCC’s original order in Pacifica did categorically declare

85. Id.
86. Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4978 (2004).
87. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13323 (2006).
88. Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4978 (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Lemoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 60–61 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(“An agency is by no means required to distinguish every precedent cited to it by an aggrieved
party. . . . But where, as here, a party makes a significant showing that analogous cases have
been decided differently, the agency must do more than simply ignore that argument.”).
92. See Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d
94, ¶ 14 (1975) (“Applying these considerations to the language used in the monologue broadcast
by Pacifica’s station WBAI, in New York, the Commission concludes that words such as ‘fuck,’
‘shit,’ ‘piss,’ ‘motherfucker,’ ‘cocksucker,’ ‘cunt’ and ‘tit’ depict sexual and excretory activities
and organs in a manner patently offensive by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium and are accordingly ‘indecent’ when broadcast on radio or television.”
(emphasis added)).
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that “words such as ‘fuck,’ . . . depict sexual and excretory activities
and organs in a manner patently offensive by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium,”93 it made that
statement in the context of a daytime broadcast of an unquestionably
lewd comedy routine. If Pacifica’s broad language did mean that any
use of the “F-Word” always depicts or describes sexual or excretory
activities, then it probably committed the fallacy of division—it
would have based its conclusion that a particular offensive word is
always indecent on the premise that Carlin’s monologue was
indecent as a whole. On the other hand, if Pacifica merely stands for
the proposition that use of the “F-Word” is indecent when it actually
describes or depicts sexual activities, then the FCC’s reliance on
Pacifica’s broad language is a vicious abstraction because it ignores
the context of the language in Pacifica.
Furthermore, the authority of the FCC’s Pacifica decision seems
questionable considering the narrowness of the Supreme Court
opinion that upheld it94 and the FCC’s subsequent interpretation of
the Supreme Court’s opinion. Following Pacifica, the FCC took the
position that First Amendment principles act as a significant
constraint on enforcement of Congress’s policy.95 In a 1978 order,
the FCC proclaimed:
With regard to “indecent” or “profane” utterances, the First
Amendment and the “no censorship” provision of Section 326 of
the Communications Act severely limit any role by the Commission
and the courts in enforcing the proscription contained in Section
1464. The Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation . . . , decided July 3, 1978, affords this Commission no
general prerogative to intervene in any case where words similar or
identical to those in Pacifica are broadcast over a licensed radio or
television station. We intend strictly to observe the narrowness of
the Pacifica holding.96

Because the FCC’s Pacifica decision generally, and the language
cited from that decision specifically, are less than mandatory, the
FCC’s appeal to authority in this case is fallacious. A careful review
would question the adequacy of this reasoning to support the FCC’s

93.
94.
95.
96.
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rather drastic change. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ignored the
logical errors in this explanation and upheld the FCC’s decision.
The FCC’s explanation supporting its abandonment of the
literal/nonliteral distinction relied heavily on its Pacifica decision,
but it did eventually provide somewhat more than a blatant appeal to
authority. In the Golden Globes Order, the FCC’s argument was
entirely conclusory: “[W]e believe that, given the core meaning of
the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word . . . inherently has a sexual
connotation, and therefore [depicts or describes sexual activities].”97
But in Fox Television Stations, the FCC expounded somewhat on this
reasoning, arguing that the “F-Word”’s “power to ‘intensify’ and
offend derives from its implicit sexual meaning.”98 Furthermore, the
FCC noted that “the first dictionary definition of the ‘F-Word’ is
sexual in nature.”99
But even assuming the FCC is correct, the fact that a word’s
power to offend derives from its sexual meaning does not inevitably
lead to the conclusion that the word necessarily depicts or describes
sexual activity in any context. Speakers may use strong or offensive
language to express the magnitude of their feelings on a particular
topic or to cope with pain100 or, perhaps, simply to convey a persona
of badassness. For instance, it may be offensive to many people to
describe a music award as “fucking brilliant,” but it takes a stretch of
the imagination to conjure up a sexual mental image from that
comment. When the speaker does not intend to describe or depict
sexual activities or organs, and the listeners, while shocked or
offended, do not receive a sexual message, it is nonsensical to
conclude that the word does, in fact, convey a sexual message simply
because of one of its dictionary definitions.101 Of course, there may
97. Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4978 (2004).
98. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13304–05 (2006) (citing Robert F.
Bloomquist, The F-Word: A Jurisprudential Taxonomy of American Morals (In a Nutshell), 40
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 65, 98 (1999)). The citation to Bloomquist without more is yet another
appeal to authority.
99. Id. at 13304 (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 559 (4th ed.
2002) (defining the “F-Word” as “1: to have sexual intercourse with”).
100. As anyone who has hit his or her thumb with a hammer can attest.
101. The fact that the F-Word’s “first” definition is sexual is irrelevant. As Stephen
Mouritsen has observed, dictionary definitions are rarely organized by hierarchical significance
and those dictionaries that do attempt to put “core” definitions first have no scientifically
defensible methodology for their ordering. Stephen Mouritsen, Comment, The Dictionary Is
Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a New Way Forward in the Resolution of Lexical
Ambiguity, 2010 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming). As a matter of common sense, I am willing to
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be cases where it is unclear whether the usage is literal or
nonliteral,102 but this does not lead to the conclusion that the
distinction makes no sense. Rather, it indicates that the distinction
may sometimes be difficult to draw.
In spite of these flaws, the Supreme Court endorsed the FCC’s
arguments. Speaking for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded
without any discussion that “[i]t was certainly reasonable to
determine that it made no sense to distinguish between literal and
nonliteral uses of offensive words . . . .”103 Justice Breyer, on the
other hand, assumed the validity of the FCC’s argument but could
not see how the argument explained the FCC’s decision to change:
“The FCC was aware of the coarseness of the ‘image’ the first time
around.”104 Further, the FCC had originally made the distinction to
avoid constitutional problems of censorship, and “[s]imply to
announce that the words, whether used descriptively or as expletives,
call forth similar ‘images’ is not to address those reasons.”105 Overall,
the Court’s highly deferential approach to the FCC’s argument
signals that agencies may indulge in fallacious reasoning to bolster
their decisions when more sound arguments are unavailable.
2. Protecting the listener from the “first blow” of offensive language
The majority in Fox Television Stations also accepted the FCC’s
argument that the fleeting expletive policy should be abandoned
concede that the F-Word’s “core” meaning is sexual. However, when the context of a
statement clearly shows that a different meaning is intended, I fail to see how, as a matter of
logic, the core meaning should take precedence anyway.
102. Even while eschewing the literal/nonliteral distinction, the FCC argued that Cher’s
use of the “F-Word” during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards was literal:
In this case, Cher did more than use the “F-Word” as a mere interjection or
intensifier. Rather, she used the word to describe or reference a sexual act as a
metaphor to express hostility to her critics. The fact that she was not literally
suggesting that people engage in sexual activities does not necessarily remove the
use of the term from the realm of descriptions or depictions.
Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13324 (2006). Justice Scalia characterized the FCC’s
explanation of why Cher’s statement would have violated its earlier policy as “not entirely
convincing,” but nevertheless superfluous. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800,
1812 (2009). This is one example where it might be difficult to distinguish between literal and
expletive uses of offensive words. However, the FCC’s argument appears to tacitly admit that
“interjection[s] or intensifier[s]” are rarely, if ever, meant to be taken literally. Remand Order,
21 F.C.C.R. at 13324.
103. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1812.
104. Id. at 1838 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
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because prime-time broadcasts of offensive language require the
listener to suffer the “first blow.”106 This idea stems from the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Pacifica that, because radio broadcasts
intrude into the privacy of the home where audiences are constantly
tuning in or out, the “individual’s right to be left alone plainly
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”107 According
to the Court, “To say that one may avoid further offense by turning
off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.”108
In applying the “first blow” rationale to the context of fleeting
expletives in the Remand Order, the FCC worried that a per se
exception would allow broadcasters “to air expletives at all hours of a
day so long as they did so one at a time.”109 In Justice Scalia’s view,
this reasoning appeared to build upon the FCC’s worry, expressed in
the Golden Globes Order, that routine non-action against fleeting
expletives “would ‘likely lead to more widespread use of the offensive
language.’”110
The FCC’s primary argument—that a per se exception would
allow broadcasts of fleeting expletives at all hours of the day—is
sound. However, the contention that broadcasters will seize on the
exception and proliferate the use of offensive language is a fallacious,
slippery slope argument. As Justice Breyer observed, the FCC’s
fleeting expletive policy had been in effect for twenty-five years, yet

106. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812–13 (2009); see also Remand
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. ¶ 25.
107. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397
U.S. 728 (1970)).
108. Id. at 748–49. The “first blow” argument perhaps employs the informal fallacy of
false analogy. Speech is qualitatively different from physical assault. Indeed, in public settings,
the Supreme Court does say that the remedy for such an assault is to run away after the first
blow. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (“Those in the Los Angeles courthouse
could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities [caused by offensive language
on Cohen’s jacket] simply by averting their eyes.”). On a basic level, Pacifica upheld
restrictions on radio transmission not because offensive speech is always analogous to physical
assault, but because that assault on the sensibilities occurred within the privacy of a person’s
home. Even if it is technically fallacious, however, this analogy hits rhetorical paydirt. Because
individuals do have rights to be free from offensive language in their homes, the analogy that
failed in Cohen works wonderfully here.
109. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13309 (2006).
110. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812–13 (quoting Golden
Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4979 (2004)).
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the FCC had presented no evidence that broadcasters used it as a
license to air offensive language one program at a time.111
The majority recognized the slippery slope quality of the FCC’s
fear but accepted the argument anyway. Justice Scalia concluded that
“[i]t is surely rational (if not inescapable) to believe that a safe
harbor for single words would ‘likely lead to more widespread use of
the offensive language.’”112 He even endorsed the FCC’s slippery
slope argument, arguing that “even in the absence of evidence, the
agency’s predictive judgment (which merits deference) makes entire
sense. . . . [The prediction] seems to us an exercise in logic rather
than clairvoyance.”113 Thus, the majority opinion signals that courts
should, at least in some circumstances, defer to agency predictions of
negative consequences stemming from an existing policy—and
should accordingly uphold departures from that policy on the basis
of such predictions—even when the prediction is unsupported by any
evidence, and the likelihood of it actually occurring is low.
While the FCC’s “first blows” rationale relies on a slippery slope
argument, perhaps the more serious problem is that it answers the
wrong question. Justice Breyer observed that the idea of “first
blows” was available to the FCC when it first adopted its fleeting
expletives policy, but the FCC adopted the policy anyway,
presumably to avoid the First Amendment issues that would
accompany stricter enforcement.114 Therefore, while the “first blow”
rationale does support the FCC’s policy choice as such, it does not,
by itself, support the decision to change policy.115 If the question is
whether the FCC was justified in changing course,116 its discussion of

111. Id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1812–13 (majority opinion).
113. Id. at 1814.
114. See id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
115. See id.
116. State Farm appeared to direct courts to focus on the reason for change in asking
whether a shift in policy is arbitrary or capricious. It held that “an agency changing its course
by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which
may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). Justice Scalia, however,
rejected the proposition that an agency must always focus on the fact of change:
[T]he agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would
suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate. Sometimes it must—when, for
example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which
underlay its prior policy . . . . In such cases it is not that further justification is
demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is
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first blows is irrelevant. Rather, the FCC should have focused on
why the first blows argument did not caution against a fleeting
expletives exception originally, but now does.
Overall, the FCC’s reasoning that the fleeting expletives
exception must be abandoned to avoid subjecting children to the
first blow of offensive language is, at best, moderately persuasive.
The FCC employed a slippery slope argument and ignored the
question of whether a first blow rationale justified a change in policy
in light of the reasons for adopting its original policy. These
arguments were, however, persuasive enough to convince five
members of the Supreme Court not to set aside its orders as arbitrary
and capricious. The Court’s decision signals that agencies may
commit errors in reasoning and still receive substantial deference.
3. Constitutional questions
The FCC’s decision to abandon its fleeting expletives exception
has potentially serious implications for the constitutional right to
freedom of speech. Most obviously, the new standard appears to
prohibit any intentional broadcast of the “F-Word” or other,
similarly offensive language.117 However, even assuming the
needed for disregarding the facts and circumstances that underlay or were
engendered by the prior policy.
Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1811 (majority opinion). Nevertheless, if the agency’s
action may be cast as a decision to change a policy rather than a decision to adopt a policy, and
State Farm requires a reasoned explanation for the decision itself, then it makes sense to say
that the appropriate question is whether the explanation supports the decision to change policy
and not just whether the explanation supports the decision to adopt the policy. Justice Breyer
offered an extreme but insightful example supporting this point of view:
To explain a change requires more than setting forth reasons why the new policy is a
good one. It also requires the agency to answer the question, “Why did you
change?” And a rational answer to this question typically requires a more complete
explanation than would prove satisfactory were change itself not at issue. An
(imaginary) administrator explaining why he chose a policy that requires driving on
the right-side, rather than the left-side, of the road might say, “Well, one side
seemed as good as the other, so I flipped a coin.” But even assuming the rationality
of that explanation for an initial choice, that explanation is not at all rational if
offered to explain why the administrator changed driving practice, from right-side to
left-side, 25 years later.
Id. at 1830–31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117. Whether such broadcasts actually are entitled to First Amendment protection may
very well be a close question. The FCC was probably correct in its observation that Pacifica
left the question open. See Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4982 (2004). However, in
Fox Television Stations, Justice Thomas expressed doubts on the continuing viability of both
Pacifica and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), in that they carve out
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constitutionality of that prohibition, the rule also has a potential
chilling effect on broadcasts that would warrant protection. In
particular, small local broadcasters who cannot afford “bleeping”
technology118 may not be willing to provide coverage of live events
for fear of accidentally broadcasting a fleeting expletive.119 Despite
these concerns, the FCC concluded that the First Amendment does
not forbid the new rule. And while the FCC’s justification for its
conclusion that the new policy is constitutional includes instances of
fallacious reasoning, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s action.
The main problem with the FCC’s treatment of the
constitutionality of its action was pointed out by Justice Breyer in his
dissent to Fox Television Stations. He argued that the FCC’s
reasoning on the First Amendment implications of its decision was
deficient because it was entirely nonexistent.120 While the FCC did
produce “‘four full pages of small-type, single-spaced text’”121
defending the constitutionality of broadcast indecency regulations,
that discussion was entirely irrelevant to whether the agency could
justify its change in policy. In fact, the FCC’s discussion of
constitutional issues in the Remand Order does little more than
reject the petitioner’s argument that Pacifica itself has been so
eroded as to be no longer viable.122 The FCC’s discussion certainly
supports its argument that Pacifica remains good law,123 but it does

the broadcast medium for different First Amendment treatment. See Fox Television Stations,
129 S. Ct. at 1819–20 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately . . . to note the
questionable viability of the two precedents that support the FCC’s assertion of constitutional
authority to regulate the programming at issue in this case.”). While Thomas was alone in his
concurrence, it would not be surprising if other Justices who were unwilling to venture any
views on the First Amendment question without full briefing would, given an appropriate case,
agree that Pacifica and Red Lion have outlived their usefulness. Scholars have also criticized
those cases and called for their abandonment. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Tucker Lecture,
Law and Medium Symposium, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449, 1453–54 (2009) (arguing that,
with the advent of the internet, medium-by-medium approach to the First Amendment no
longer makes any sense); see also Robert Corn-Revere, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.:
Awaiting the Next Act, 2008–09 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 295, 313–315 (observing that much has
changed since the Court decided Pacifica, including advancements in technology and
developments in the law governing indecency).
118. See infra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
119. See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1835–37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1834 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
121. See id. (quoting plurality opinion, 129 S. Ct. at 1817–18).
122. 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13316–21 (2006).
123. See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1834 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In
[responding to industry arguments that changes in the nature of the broadcast industry made
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not explain why the FCC should revise its understanding of the
scope of permissible restrictions on speech that Pacifica approved.
The FCC’s observation that its decision was “‘not inconsistent with
the Supreme Court ruling in Pacifica’ . . . [does] not acknowledge
that an entirely different understanding of Pacifica underlay the
FCC’s earlier policy.”124
In sum, Justice Breyer’s complaint is not that Pacifica necessarily
requires a different result—perhaps the FCC could have articulated
valid reasons for changing its reading of Pacifica—but rather that the
agency failed to explain why it once believed Pacifica required a
different result but no longer does.
Yet, even if the FCC had provided an explanation for
reinterpreting Pacifica, it would still have been necessary to address
the constitutional question as a matter of first impression. Until the
Golden Globes Order, the FCC had never found the use of a fleeting
expletive to be indecent, so it had never had to decide whether such
a finding would be constitutional. The FCC is charged with the
responsibility to enforce the prohibition on indecent speech, but also
with a responsibility not to censor the airwaves. It, therefore, has a
statutory responsibility to consider and decide First Amendment
questions when its policies might interfere with freedom of
expression.125 Simply announcing that a decision with serious
constitutional implications is “not inconsistent” with a Supreme
Court case that did not even address the question abdicates that
responsibility.
According to Justice Breyer, one aspect in particular deserved
greater treatment by the FCC—the chilling effect the FCC’s new
policy would have on small local broadcasters’ ability to provide live
coverage of local events.126 Broadcasters had contended through

all indecency regulation unconstitutional, the FCC] repeatedly reaffirmed its view that
Pacifica remains good law.”).
124. Id. (quoting Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4982 (2004)).
125. See The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 352, 360–
61 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court should have reached the constitutional question in
Fox Television Stations because “Congress essentially commanded the FCC to rely on sound
constitutional groundwork when it enacted 47 U.S.C. § 326”). Whether the Court should
have reached the constitutional question itself is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the
FCC unquestionably should have made a constitutional determination and its reliance on
Pacifica was insufficient to support its decision that the new policy was constitutional even
though Pacifica itself does not require a finding that the new policy was unconstitutional.
126. See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1835–37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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every stage of the litigation that the FCC’s new policy would create a
substantial burden on small local broadcasters. They complained that
“the costs of bleeping/delay systems, up to $100,000 for installation
and annual operation, place that technology beyond the financial
reach of many smaller independent local stations.”127 With a threat of
fines up to $325,000 for a broadcast of indecent speech, some local
broadcasters had already halted coverage of “‘live events where
crowds are present . . . unless they affect matters of public safety or
convenience.’”128
The FCC, however, said nothing in response to these claims.
Rather, it responded only to general objections to the mandatory use
of delay systems, arguing that, at least for live awards shows, a delay
of several seconds does not “significantly implicate[] First
Amendment values.”129 Therefore, the FCC concluded that
“[h]olding Fox responsible for airing indecent material in this case
does not place live broadcasts at risk or impose undue burdens on
broadcasters.”130 In syllogistic terms, the argument may be restated
as follows: a delay of several seconds in the broadcast of a live awards
show does not implicate the First Amendment; the offensive
language in question occurred during the broadcast of live awards
shows; therefore, holding Fox responsible does not place live
broadcasts at risk or impose undue burdens on broadcasters.
This argument is a non sequitur. First, the premise—that
requiring a delay for live awards shows broadcast by a major
network—does not necessarily support the conclusion that nonawards show broadcasts by other broadcasters are not at risk or
127. Id. at 1835–36.
128. Id. at 1836.
129. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13313 (2006). The FCC noted that the
Billboard Music Awards cases did not deal with breaking news or sports programming. Id. at
13313 n.102. However, it did reverse its earlier indecency determination against CBS for
broadcasting the word, “bullshitter,” during a live interview on the Early Show. Id. at 13326–
28. While the complaints had characterized the interview as no more than promotion for
CBS’s entertainment program, Survivor: Vanuatu, the FCC deferred to CBS’s contention that
the broadcast was a bona fide news interview. The FCC stated, “in light of the important First
Amendment interests at stake as well as the crucial role that context plays in our indecency
determinations, it is imperative that we proceed with the utmost restraint when it comes to
news programming.” Id. at 13327. It is worth noting that the FCC’s willingness to brave the
treacherous grounds of distinguishing between “news programming” and entertainment or
promotional programming—retaining a fleeting expletive exception in the one but not the
other—creates some tension with its conclusion that it makes no sense to distinguish between
literal and expletive uses of offensive words.
130. Id. at 13313.
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subject to an undue burden. The argument might be more
persuasive if the FCC could assume that all broadcasters have access
to delay equipment, but parties before the FCC explicitly refuted the
assumption. Thus, the argument ignores the scenario actually put
forward that might render the rule facially invalid.
Neither can the FCC’s conclusion be sustained by its promise to
exercise caution when reviewing broadcasts of news or sports
programming.131 Local stations that lack access to delay/bleeping
equipment may want to cover live events that would not qualify as
news or sports programming.132 And even if a particular broadcast
does qualify as news or sports programming, a guarantee of caution
does not equal the absence of risk.
Thus, the FCC’s assurance that its new policy does not place live
broadcasts by broadcasters that cannot afford delay/bleeping
equipment at risk seems fairly hollow, and the behavior of small
broadcasters following the FCC’s new rule reflects a disquieting lack
of confidence in the FCC’s reasoning. In spite of the order’s
language, the new rule does impose a risk on live broadcasts, and the
FCC should have offered an explanation for why imposing that risk
is constitutional.
Notwithstanding these errors in the FCC’s reasoning, a majority
of the Supreme Court did not find the “plight of the small local
broadcaster”133 problematic. While Justice Scalia’s specific responses
to the dissent’s arguments commanded only four votes,134 the
majority did specifically decline Justice Breyer’s suggestion to
remand the case so that the agency could “‘reconsider its policy

131. See id. (“This case does not involve breaking news coverage that Fox and other
broadcasters have traditionally presented in so-called ‘real time.’”).
132. Furthermore, whether a particular broadcast qualifies as news or sports
programming may sometimes present a difficult question. See supra note 129.
133. See Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1818.
134. See id. at 1815–19. Justice Kennedy agreed with the bulk of Justice Scalia’s opinion,
but did not join the portion of the opinion refuting Justice Breyer’s arguments. In his
concurrence, Justice Kennedy asserted that the FCC had merely changed its reading of Pacifica
and, while “[t]he reasons the agency announces for this change are not so precise, detailed, or
elaborate as to be a model for agency explanation[,] . . . the reasons for its action were the sort
of reasons an agency may consider and act upon.” Id. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Even though it does not have the full weight of a majority,
Justice Scalia’s defense of the FCC decision in the plurality portion of the decision indicates the
willingness of a substantial portion of the Court to tolerate and even endorse logical error in
administrative policymaking decisions.
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decision in light of’ constitutional concerns.”135 The majority
concluded such a remand would equate to “judicial arm-twisting or
appellate review by the wagged finger.”136
The plurality portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion goes much
farther, however, in defending the FCC’s reasoning. Scalia first
addressed Justice Breyer’s contention that the FCC failed to explain
“‘why [it] changed its mind about the line that Pacifica draws or its
policy’s relation to that line.’”137 According to Scalia, such an
explanation is unnecessary: “Pacifica . . . drew no constitutional line;
to the contrary it expressly declined to express any view on the
constitutionality of prohibiting isolated indecency.”138 Scalia is
correct that Pacifica did not draw any constitutional line, which
makes his argument is persuasive, but the argument could well be
criticized as a vicious abstraction. Justice Breyer’s characterization of
Pacifica as drawing a “constitutional line” is imprecise, but when
read in the context of his opinion as a whole, his argument is not so
easily overcome. Breyer’s opinion did not argue that Pacifica itself
had drawn a line, but rather that the FCC believed a line had been
drawn and acted accordingly.139 Thus, Justice Breyer’s argument is
not that one reading of Pacifica is correct, but rather that when an
agency changes from a narrow interpretation of a Supreme Court
opinion to a more constitutionally suspect interpretation, it should
explain why the new approach is constitutional.
Justice Scalia also defended the FCC against the “plight of the
small local broadcaster.” In general, Justice Scalia’s tone is
sarcastic—perhaps to minimize the concerns pointed out by Justice
Breyer and to portray the opposing argument as frivolous. For
instance, Justice Scalia expressed his doubt “that small-town
broadcasters run a heightened risk of liability for indecent utterances.
In programming that they originate, their down-home local guests

135. Id. at 1812 n.3 (majority opinion).
136. Id. This characterization of the dissent’s argument probably misses the point since
Justice Breyer would demand only that the FCC provide a reasoned explanation for its
decision, not that it reach any particular outcome. The majority apparently saw Justice Breyer’s
argument as an attempt to address the constitutional questions that the Court wished to avoid.
137. Id. at 1817 (plurality portion of majority opinion) (quoting id. at 1834 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
138. Id.
139. See id. at 1833 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The FCC . . . made clear that it thought
that Justice Powell’s concurrence set forth a constitutional line that its indecency policy should
embody.”).
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probably employ vulgarity less than big-city folks; and small-town
stations generally cannot afford or cannot attract foul-mouthed
glitteratae from Hollywood.”140 This argument not only attempts to
poison the well by ridiculing the opposing argument, it also
completely misconstrues the opposing argument. Justice Scalia
confuses “small local broadcasters,” which might very well exist in
the heart of Hollywood and other big cities, with “small-town
broadcasters,” which, according to Justice Scalia, should have no
problems with indecent language. Furthermore, just as the FCC
avoided the scenarios that are most troubling, Justice Scalia’s
argument ignores the major argument put forward. The live
programming that the petitioners feared would be chilled was not so
much “guest shows” as live local events—city council meetings,
sporting events, community dance contests, and so forth.141 The
plurality simply dismissed these concerns as unimportant or, at most,
not urgent.142
Arising out of sarcasm, Justice Scalia does make a fairly persuasive
argument—that Justice Breyer’s concerns rely on a “demonstrably
false assumption that the Remand Order makes no provision for the
avoidance of unfairness—that the single-utterance prohibition will be
invoked uniformly, in all situations.”143 This argument appears
persuasive because, if correct, Justice Breyer’s position would be
defeated from the outset. But, even if Justice Breyer did make that
assumption (he probably does not) and the assumption is false (it
probably is), Justice Breyer’s argument on the whole does not stand
or fall on the assumption. Perhaps the FCC’s assurance that it
“would consider the facts of each individual case” in determining
“‘what, if any, remedy is appropriate’”144 is sufficient to prevent fines
for broadcasts that are actually within First Amendment protection.
However, it does not eliminate the risk that is most likely to chill

140. Id. at 1818 (plurality portion of majority opinion).
141. See id. at 1836 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 1819 (plurality portion of majority opinion) (“Justice BREYER can safely
defer his concern for those yeomen of the airwaves until we have before us a case that involves
one.”). Justice Scalia’s move to defer the decision of a facial attack on the constitutionality of
the FCC’s new rule is consistent with the Court’s unanimous decision not to reach
constitutional questions in a challenge under the APA. The problem here is not that the rule
should be set aside because it is constitutionally overbroad, but because the FCC failed to even
consider an important argument.
143. Id. at 1818 (plurality portion of majority opinion).
144. Id. (quoting Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13313 (2006)).
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expression—the risk of prosecution for allegedly indecent broadcasts.
Justice Breyer’s main concern is not that small broadcasters will be
treated unfairly in prosecutions, but that the threat of prosecution
and punishment will cause self-censorship by small broadcasters who
could not afford to risk even the possibility of an indecency fine. The
FCC should have at least addressed this constitutional dilemma
beyond a conclusory assertion that its decision would not “impose
undue burdens on broadcasters.”145 Justice Scalia, however, would
defer to the FCC’s conclusion without further support.
Finally, Justice Scalia defends the FCC’s resolution of the First
Amendment question by criticizing Justice Breyer for comparing the
agency decision-making process to what would have been required
had the agency engaged in notice and comment rulemaking.146 Scalia
dismisses this argument by citing Vermont Yankee, which foreclosed
attempts by courts to incorporate “all of the Administrative
Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment procedural requirements into
arbitrary-and-capricious review of adjudicatory decisions.”147 Justice
Scalia’s appeal to Vermont Yankee is probably appropriate in refuting
the premise he attributes to Justice Breyer. Vermont Yankee did, in
fact, abolish the judicial practice of imposing upon agencies
procedures not required by the APA.148
However, Justice Scalia oversimplified Justice Breyer’s actual
argument. While courts are not free to impose onerous procedures,
arbitrary and capricious review requires a determination of whether
the agency considered all “important aspect[s] of the problem.”149
Because the reviewing court must make its determination by
reference to the record developed by the agency,150 even informal
proceedings
(including
adjudications)
must
develop
an

145. See Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R at 13313. It is clear that the FCC thought this
statement addressed the concerns regarding small broadcasters; the Remand Order included a
footnote to the portion of the networks’ joint comments that raised the issue. See id. at 13313
n.101 (citing Joint Comments of Fox Television Stations, Inc., CBS Broadcasting Inc., NBC
Universal, Inc., and NBC Telemundo License Co., at 12–16).
146. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1819 n.8 (plurality portion of majority
opinion).
147. Id. (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 545–49 (1978)).
148. See generally Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
149. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1838 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Motor
Vehicle Mfr. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
150. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971).
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administrative record sufficient to demonstrate that the agency
considered all the important aspects of the problem.151 Justice
Breyer’s argument is that the FCC orders failed to develop and rely
upon such a record, and Justice Breyer probably referenced notice
and comment rulemaking procedures simply to highlight the
agency’s failures in this case.152
In sum, the FCC’s explanations for its decision to abandon the
fleeting expletives policy were riddled with logical error. Not only are
the reasons for the new policy logically suspect, but more
importantly, the reasons for the change and for why the new policy
comports with the First Amendment are almost entirely absent. The
Court’s decision appears to stand for the proposition that, at least in
cases where an initial agency decision is merely based on a particular,
nonexclusive, reading of Supreme Court precedent,153 the agency
may select a different reading of that precedent without providing
any rigorous discussion of potential constitutional problems
attending the new policy.
B. Political Motivations and Logical Error
Overall, the logical flaws in the FCC’s reasoning cast suspicion
on the claim that the Golden Globes Order and Remand Order are the
products of an unbiased and logic-driven decision-making process.
And if the decisions were not driven by logic, it seems likely that
political preferences substituted as the motivating force. Indeed, as
Justice Scalia observed, the Golden Globes Order came on the heels of
hearings before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and the Internet wherein FCC Commissioners “were grilled about
enforcement shortcomings.”154

151. See Center for Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 956 F.2d 309, 314 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
152. See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1838 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Here the
agency did not make new policy through the medium of notice and comment proceedings.
But the same failures here—where the policy is important, the significance of the issues clear,
the failures near complete—should lead us to the same conclusion.”).
153. See id. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“The present case does not raise the concerns addressed in State Farm. Rather than base its
prior policy on its knowledge of the broadcast industry and its audience, the FCC instead
based its policy on what it considered to be our holding in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation . . . .
But, as the opinion for the Court well explains, the FCC’s reasons for its action were the sort
of reasons an agency may consider and act upon.”).
154. Id. at 1816 n.4 (plurality portion of majority opinion).
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Assuming that politics, and not logic, motivated the FCC
decision, the question remains whether political motivation is
acceptable.155 While a plurality recognized some political pressure,156
the majority upheld the orders because they were supported by
sufficiently reasonable explanations, not because the Commissioners
were directed to change the policy by those with political power over
them. Had the FCC attempted to justify its orders simply by saying,
“The House Subcommittee threatened to defund an important
program unless we abandoned the fleeting expletives exception,” its
decision probably would have been set aside as arbitrary and
capricious, or possibly even as a violation of principles of separation
of powers.157 The Court’s decision in Fox Television Stations appears
to cling to the ideal that agency decisions will be justified by
expertise and logic rather than politics. But its reference to the
significant political pressure from Congress suggests that the Court
recognizes a role for politics in agency action. Rather than
developing the role political factors may legitimately play, the Court
appears to have simply lowered the bar for what qualifies as a
reasoned decision. While it may be too early to make definitive
conclusions after one case, Fox Television Stations suggests that an
agency might get away with making a decision solely for political
reasons as long as it can provide a non-political explanation, even if
the explanation relies on fallacious reasoning. As long as the agency’s
explanation does not ignore prior factual findings that motivated an
earlier contrary decision,158 courts may tolerate a fairly high degree of
informal logical error.
V. CONCLUSION
Administrative agencies and independent agencies in particular,
occupy a unique position in the American legal framework. On the
155. See supra text accompanying note 81.
156. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1816 n.4 (plurality portion of majority
opinion).
157. The answer to a possible separation of powers challenge would be far from clear, but
the argument would be that an agency wielding executive power cannot constitutionally take
direction directly from Congress or any of its members. The separation of powers dilemma
might be alleviated were the political direction to come from the President, but even in that
case State Farm has been widely read to mean that agency decisions may not be justified solely
by political considerations. See Watts, supra note 80, at 19–20.
158. See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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one hand, the Constitution provides little guidance on how agencies
may exercise power or how much power they may exercise. Thus,
broad authority within an agency gives rise to a well-founded fear of
abuse. On the other hand, the political realities of modern life
require authority to lie within administrations; without at least some
agency authority, government might grind to a halt.
Thus, while perhaps it must be accepted that agencies will wield
great power, the American system demands that this power be
constrained. Congress established a constraint on agency power by
providing that any agency decision that is arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion may be reversed upon review in the courts. The
Supreme Court gave this constraint meaning in State Farm, where it
held that exercises of agency discretion must be supported by a
reasoned explanation. However, at least in cases where agency action
does not require factual findings, Fox Television Stations seems to
suggest that the Court will grant significant leeway to logical error in
an agency’s explanation for its actions, leaving the door open for
agency decisions to be driven by politics rather than logic.
Samuel G. Brooks
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